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Abstract. Our paper aims to investigate inference rules for Nelson's log-
ics and to discuss possible ways to determine admissibility of inference
rules in such logics. We will use the technique oered originally for intu-
itionistic logic and paraconsistent minimal Johannson's logic. However,
the adaptation is not an easy and evident task since Nelson's logics
do not enjoy replacement of equivalences rule. Therefore we consider
and compare standard admissibility and weak admissibility. Our paper
founds algorithms for recognizing weak admissibility and admissibility
itself { for restricted cases, to show the problems arising in the course
of study.
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1. Introduction
In the area of non-classical logics, besides discussions concerning ecient
axiomatizations, the question of applicability possible new inference rules,
dierent from standard ones, was set up in 1950x by P.Lorenzen. In par-
ticular, he, it seems, rst time formulated the concept of admissibility for
inference rules in precise terms. The admissibility problem (to determine
for any given rule if this rule is admissible for a given logic) was in focus
of interest for many logicians. Active research in the area may be dated to
Harvey Friedman problem [15]: if there is an algorithm for verication of
admissibility in the intuitionistic propositional logic IPC (this problem was
rst solved by Rybakov in 1984, [29]). Then the admissibility has been in-
vestigated from various viewpoints for many dierent logical systems related
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to non-classical propositional logics (cf. V. Rybakov [30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 34],
Rybakov, et al [2, 3], R. Iemho [4, 5], R. Iemho and G. Metcalfe [6], E. Jer-
abek [8, 11, 9, 7]). Algorithmic problem of recognizing admissibility, problem
of descriptions bases for admissible rules, and many other related questions
were considered. For example, only a necessary condition for admissibility of
inference rules in the branching-time temporal logic TS4 was found in [36],
though for linear temporal logic LTL the problem was solved in full [34].
Complexity problem for admissibility in intuitionistic logic and some modal
logics was rst studied and re-solved in Jerabek [10]. A new approach to
study admissible rules was oered by S. Ghilardi via unication technique.
He in ([12], 1999) rst found an algorithm writing out a complete set of uni-
ers for any uniable in IPC formula, and this gives another solution for
admissibility problem.
This our article continues the investigation of admissible rules in para-
consistent logics [25], which was started in [24]. In that paper the problematic
of admissibility and unication was addressed to minimal Johansson's logic
J [16] and positive intuitionistic logic IPC+. The rst of these logics has the
negation weaker then the intuitionistic one, whereas the second logic sim-
ply lacks the negation connective. The most essential diculties arising in
the study of admissibility for such logics is connected with the impossibility
to use the Godel-Tarski translation. In case of intuitionistic logic, the prob-
lem of admissibility for inference rules with parameters was solved earlier
by V. Rybakov in [31], where the proof was essentially based on the Godel-
Tarski translation of intuitionistic logic into S4. In [24], we presented the
construction which does not appeal to modal language, and due to this rea-
son modications of this construction can be applied to a wide class of logics
based on the positive fragment of intuitionistic logic. In [24], we adopted
this technique to solve the admissibility and unication problems for posi-
tive intuitionistic logic IPC+. In the present article we make the rst eort
to study the admissibility problem for extensions of Nelson's logic and give
further applications of the construction developed in [24].
To overcome the non-constructivity of intuitionistic negation D. Nel-
son [19] suggested the concept of constructible falsity, which assumes that
the falsity of atomic statements is given explicitly, and the falsity of com-
plex statements is reduced to the truth or falsity of its constituents via a
constructive procedure. Subsequently, his system of constructive logic with
strong negation, traditionally denoted by N3, was axiomatized by Vorob'ev
[38, 39] and studied algebraically by Helena Rasiowa [26, 27].
The concept of constructible falsity agrees well with that of paracon-
sistency. If the falsity of an atom p represented as  p, the strong negation
of p, is given explicitly, we may admit that both p and  p are true. The
paraconsistent Nelson's logic N4 is obtained by deleting the \explosive" ax-
iom  p! (p! q) from the axiomatics of N3. From the early 1970s several
versions of N4 were studied independently by R. Routley (later R. Sylvan) in
the propositional case in [28], by Lopez-Escobar in [18] and by Nelson himself
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in [1], both in the rst-order case. Algebraic semantics for N4 was suggested
in [20].
Kripke semantics for N3 ( [37, 14]) is readily obtained from the usual
Kripke semantics for intuitionistic logic by assigning to each world, instead of
a set of atoms, a set of literals, i.e. atoms or strongly negated atoms. Equiv-
alently, the truth-assignment on atoms and worlds is 3-valued, to reect the
three cases of veried, falsied or neither. Changing to 4-valued assignments
in Kripke models produces a semantics for N4: the fourth value now cor-
responds to \overdetermined" or the situation that both a literal and its
contrary are veried at a world. This explains the choice of denotation N3
and N4. An alternative possible worlds semantics for constructive logic with
strong negation was provided by Routley in [28]. The strong negation is inter-
preted in Routley frames via -operator, which is typical for relevant logics.
In this paper, we will consider Kripke frames augmented with the valuation
of literals. This kind of semantics is obviously equivalent to the semantics
with four-valued assignment and ts well to the constructions from [24].
We will consider the paraconsistent Nelson's logic N4 and several ex-
tensions of the logic N4? [21]. This is a version of paraconsistent Nelson's
logic obtained from N4 by adding to the language the intuitionistic falsity
constant ? allowing to dene the intuitionistic negation as :' := ' ! ?.
The combination of paraconsistent negation  and explosive negation : in
the logic N4? is similar to the situation in logic programming, where logic
programs with two kinds of negation are considered: the traditional for logic
programming default negation (corresponding to the intuitionistic negation)
and the explicit negation based on the idea similar to that of constructible
falsity. In [23], it was proved that the logic N9, a nine-valued N4
?-extension,
serve as a deductive base for paraconsistent answer set semantics of logic pro-
grams with two kinds of negation. On the other hand, adding the constant
? to the language of N4 results in a more regular structure of the class of
N4?-extensions. As it was shown in [21], to clarify the general structure of
the class EN4? of N4?-extensions it is essential to distinguishe in this class
the subclasses Exp of explosive logics, Nor of normal logics, and Gen of logic
in general form. In this paper, we consider the admissibility problem for the
logics N3, N4N, N4, and N4?, which are the least logics of classes Exp,
Nor, Exp \ Nor, and respectively Gen.
We cannot yet solve the general admissibility problem for Nelson's log-
ics, but we can explicitly describe the strengthening of admissibility problem
for positive and intuitionistic logics which is equivalent to the admissibility
problem for Nelson's logics N4 and N4? respectively. On this way we come
to the notion of dependent admissibility, which assumes the connections be-
tween variables in the premiss and conclusion of the rule. The connected
variables must be replaced by formulas the structures of which are agreed in
one or another way. In the version of dependent admissibility equivalent to
the admissibility problem in Nelson's logics we have to divide all variables
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into ordered pairs, and replaced each pair of connected variables by a formula
and its dual.
The main feature of Kripke semantics of Nelson's logic is the indepen-
dence of interpretation of literals p and  p. Interpretations p and  p are
completely independent in case of the logics N4 and N4?, if we pass to ex-
tensions of these logics, some restriction on this pair of interpretations must
be imposed. For example, V (p) and V ( p) have empty intersection in case
of N3, or V (p) [ V ( p) is dense in the algebra of cones of a Kripke frame
in case of N4?. These observations lead to the notion of weak admissibility,
according to which we replace positive and negative occurrences of a variable
via dierent formulas. This pair of formulas is arbitrary in case of N4 and
N4? and satises some restrictions for proper N4?-extensions. For example,
elements of such pair must be consistent in case of N3. We formulate the
weak admissibility problem for all mentioned logic and show that for the log-
ics N4 and N4? this problem is equivalent to the admissibility problem for
logic Int+ and Int respectively. In this way the fact that the weak admissi-
bility problem for N4 and N4? is decidable follows from the results of [24].
In case of logics N3, N4N, and N4 there is no simple reduction to earlier
obtained results, and we have to adapt the construction from [24] to prove
that the weak admissibility problem for these logics is decidable.
2. Nelson's logics
Fix a countable set of propositional variables Prop = fp1; p2; : : : ; pn; : : :g and
an additional set of propositional variables Propy = fpy1; py2; : : : ; pyn; : : :g. By
a propositional language we mean a nite set of connectives with indicated
arities. The set of formulas of a propositional language L is obtained in a
usual way from variables of Prop with the help of connectives of L. In some
specially designated cases we will consider also an extended set of formulas
dened over the extended set of variables Prop [ Propy.
By a logic in a propositional language L with !;2 L we mean a set
of formulas closed under the rules of substitution and modus ponens. In this
case we can dene positive (intuitionistic) logic IPC+ as the least logic in
the language L+ = h_;^;!i containing the following axioms:
1. p! (q ! p)
2. (p! (q ! r))! ((p! q)! (p! r))
3. (p ^ q)! p
4. (p ^ q)! q
5. (p! q)! ((p! r)! (p! (q ^ r)))
6. p! (p _ q)
7. q ! (p _ q)
8. (p! r)! ((q ! r)! ((p _ q)! r))
Intuitionistic logic IPC is the least logic in the language
L? = h_;^;!;?i containing axioms of positive logic and the axiom
? ! p.
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In what follows we use the abbreviation '$  := ('!  ) ^ ( ! ').
Paraconsistent Nelson's logic N4 is the least logic in the language L =
h_;^;!;i, where  is a symbol for the strong negation connective, contain-
ing axioms of positive logic and the following axioms for the strong negation:
(1)  (p _ q)$ ( p^  q)
(2)  (p ^ q)$ ( p_  q)
(3)  (p! q)$ (p^  q)
(4)  p$ p
Explosive Nelson's logic N3 is the least logic in the language L con-
taining axioms of the logic N4 and the Duns Scottus law for strong negation:
N3 = N4+ f p! (p! q)g.
The logic N4? is dened in the language L = L [ f?g via axioms of
N4 and the following axioms for the absurdity constant:
? ! p;  ?
Notice that if we put ? := (p! p), then
N3 ` ? ! p;  ?:
Due to this reason we can considerN3 as a logic in the language L extending
N4?. Two other important extensions of the logicN4? are dened as follows:
N4N = N4? + f::(p_  p)g; N4 = N3+ f::(p_  p)g:
For a set S  Prop, we denote by Fm+(S) (Fm?(S), Fm(S), Fm(S))
the set of formulas of the language L+ (L?, L, L) with variables from S.
We write Fm+ (Fm?, etc.) instead of Fm+(Prop) (Fm?(Prop), etc.). For
a set F of formulas, we put  F = f ' j ' 2 Fg. We denote by Lit(S) the
set of literals from variables of S, Lit(S) = S[  S. We write Lit instead of
Lit(Prop). Put Pn = fp1; : : : ; png and Litn = Lit(Pn).
Recall that IPC+ coincides with the positive fragment of logics IPC,
N3, and N4, i.e.,
IPC+ = IPC \ Fm+ = N3 \ Fm+ = N4 \ Fm+:
At the same time, IPC is the -free fragment of N4?, IPC = N4? \Fm?.
A Kripke style semantics for Nelson's logic can be dened in a similar
way to that for intuitionistic logic with the exception that valuations are
dened on sets of literals.
A frame is a pair W = hW;i, where W is a non-empty set (of possible
worlds),  is a partial order on W . A subset R of W is called a cone of
W (cone w.r.t. ) if it is upward closed w.r.t. , i.e., for every x 2 R and
y 2 W , if x  y, then y 2 R. We say that the cone R is sharp if there is
an element a 2 W such that R = fb 2 W j a  bg. In this case we will use
the denotation R = [a] and hai = [a] n fag. For a subset U of W , we denote
U #= fx 2W j x  y for some y 2 Ug.
AnN4-modelM = hW;; V i = hW; V i is a frameW augmented with a
valuation V : Lit(S)! 2W such that S is some set of propositional variables
and V (p) and V ( p) are cones w.r.t.  for all p 2 S. In this case we say
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that M is a model over W. We say that M is an N3-model if additionally
V (p) \ V ( p) = ? for all p 2 S.
An N4-model M = hW;; V i with V : Lit(S) ! 2W is said to be an
N4N-model if the equality (V (p)[V ( p)) #=W holds for all p 2 S. We say
that an N3-modelM = hW;; V i is an N4-model if it is simultaneously an
N4N-model.
The validity of formulas from Fm(S) at worlds of the model M is
dened by induction. For p 2 S, '; 2 Fm(S) and x 2W we put:
 M; x  p i x 2 V (p), M; x  p i x 2 V ( p);
 M; x  ' ^  i M; x  ' and M; x   ;
 M; x  ' _  i M; x  ' or M; x   ;
 M; x  '!  i 8y  x (M; x 2 ' or M; x   );
 M; x 1 ?, M; x  ?;
 M; x  (' ^  ) i M; x  ' or M; x   ;
 M; x  (' _  ) i M; x  ' and M; x   ;
 M; x  ('!  ) i M; x  ' and M; x   ;
 M; x  ' i M; x  '.
If M; x  ' and x  y, then M; y  '. If M is an N3-model, then for
every formula ' and worlds x we have M; x 6 '^  '.
A formula ' is valid in M, M  ', if M; x  ' for all x 2 W . A
formula ' is valid in W, W  ', if M  ' for all models M over W. For a
set of formulas  , we write M; x    (M   ) if M; x   (M   ) for all
 2  .
The semantics presented above is dierent from a more traditional ap-
proach (see, eg., [40]), which assumes the presence of two valuations V + :
S ! 2W and V   : S ! 2W and two forcing relations j=+ and j=  between
worlds and formulas. The second relation is dened for variables as follows:
x j=  p i x 2 V  (p):
The inductive steps for j= -denition repeat steps for strongly negated for-
mulas in the above denition. The equivalence of two kinds of semantics is
more or less obvious.
We often consider dierent models over the same frame W = hW;i,
therefore, it will be convenient to write W; x V ' instead of hW; V i; x  '.
We will use also shorter denotation x V ' if it does not lead to a confusion.
If we have two modelsM1 = hW; V1i andM2 = hW; V2i over the same
frame, we say that M1 and M2 (V1 and V2) agree on a set S  Dom(V1) \
Dom(V2) if V1  Lit(S) = V2  Lit(S).
If M = hW;; V i = hW; V i is a model and X is a cone of M, then
MX = hX; \X2; V Xi, where V X() = V () \X for every literal  from
the domain of V , is a submodel of M generated by X. A model M1 is a
generated submodel of M if M1 = MX for some cone X of W. It is known
that for every formula ' and x 2 X, x V ' i x V X '.
Let M = hM;; V i be a model such that V : Lit(S)! 2M and X is a
cone of M. The cone X is said to be S-denable (S-denable) if there is a
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formula ' 2 Fm(S) (' 2 Fm(S)) such that 8x 2 M(M; x  ' , x 2
X). A valuation V1 : Lit(S1) ! 2M is said to be (-)denable in M if for
every p 2 S1, the cones V1(p) and V1( p) are S-denable (S-denable).
In what follows we assume an agreement that if a model is denoted by
a calligraphic latter, its set of worlds is denoted by the same italic letter,
M = hM;; V i.
It is known that N4 and N4? are strongly complete w.r.t. the class of
all frames and complete w.r.t. the class of all nite frames. The logic N3 is
strongly complete w.r.t. the class of all N3-models and complete w.r.t. the
class of all nite N3-models. In [17], it was proved that the logic N4N (N4)
is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of all N4N-models (N4-models) and
complete w.r.t. the class of all nite N4N-models (N4-models).
If a model M = hW;; V i with V : Lit(S) ! 2W is nite, then every
world of this model lies under some maximal world. Clearly, for nite models
the dening condition of N4N-models can be replaced by the following: every
maximal world x 2W belongs to V (p)[V ( p) for all p 2 S. In other worlds,
x  p or x  p for all p 2 S:
The latter condition is equivalent to
x  ' or x  ' for all ' 2 Fm(S):
Thus, nite N4N-models are N4-models, where all maximal worlds are com-
plete w.r.t. . We know thatN3-models areN4-models, where all worlds are
consistent w.r.t. . Consequently, nite N4-models are exactly nite N3-
models, where all maximal worlds are classical, i.e. consistent and complete
w.r.t. .
For a model M = hM;; V i with V : Lit(S)! 2W and x 2M , we put
LitM(x) = f 2 Lit(S) j M; x  g, i.e., LitM(x) is the set of literals valid
at the world x of the model M. In denotation LitM(x) we omit the lower
index, if it is clear from the context, which model we mean.
We will need a small renement of the nite model property for Nelson's
logics. Assume that an N4-model M = hM;; V i with V : Lit(S) ! 2M
has an element x such that M; x  Lit(S). It is easy to see that in this case
M; x  Fm(S) (of course, M; x 6 ?). The set of all elements with this
property form a cone w.r.t.  which we denote All. Let us delete this cone
from M, that is we pass from M to the new model M0 = hM n All;0; V 0i,
where 0=MnAll and V 0() = V ()nAll for  2 Lit(S). An easy induction
on the complexity of formulas shows that
M; x  ' , M0; x  '
for all x 62 All and ' 2 Fm(S).
For x; y 2 M , the world y is said to be a duplication of x if x is the
only immediate successor of y w.r.t.  and LitM(x) = LitM(y). We say
that an N4-model M has no duplications if there is no y 2 M which is a
duplication of another element ofM . We say that x and y are twins, if they are
incomparable, have the same successors w.r.t. , and LitM(x) = LitM(y).
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If y is a duplication of x, or x and y are twins, it follows by an easy
induction on the length of formulas that for all ' we have x V ' i y V
'. Obviously, any ltration of an N4-model has no duplications and twins.
Therefore, we may conclude that every formula ' 62 N4 (' 62 N4?) is refuted
on a nite N4-model M which has no duplications and twins, and has no
world x such that M; x ` Lit(S). In a similar way, every formula ' 62 N3
(N4N, N4) is refuted on a nite N3-(N4N-, N4-)model with the same
properties.
Concluding the section we discuss normal forms of formulas with strong
negation and embeddings of Nelson's logics into positive and intuitionistic
logics.
We say that ' 2 Fm(S) (' 2 Fm(S)) is a negative normal form
(nnf) if the strong negation connective occur in ' only in front of atomic
formulas. Since the logics N4 and N4? contain all axioms of IPC+ one can
prove that these logic are closed under the positive replacement rule:
'$  
(')$ ( ) ;
where (p) is a -free formula.
However, these logics are not closed under the usual replacement rule.
Indeed, we have  (p! q)$ (p^  q) 2 N4. Assume that  (p! q)$
(p^  q) 2 N4. The left side of this equivalence is equivalent to p ! q
by axiom (4), the right side is equivalent to  p _ q by (2), (4), and
the positive replacement rule. Thus, (p ! q) $ ( p _ q) 2 N4. This fact
obviously contradicts to semantical characterization of N4.
The fact that Nelson's logics are closed under the positive replace-
ment rules and the strong negation axioms allow us to prove that every
formula can be reduced to a negative normal form. More precisely, let L 2
fN3;N4;N4?g. For every formula ', there is a nnf  such that
'$  2 L:
In what follows we assume that we have xed an algorithm assigning to a
formula ' its negative normal form '\.
Let '(p) = '(p1; : : : ; pn) 2 Fm(Fm),
'\ = '(p; p) = '0(p1; : : : ; pn; p1; : : : ; pn);
where '0 2 Fm+ (resp., '0 2 Fm?).
Put
'4 := '0(p; py) = '0(p1; : : : ; pn; p
y
1; : : : ; p
y
n);
'3 := (
n^
i=1
:(pi ^ pyi ))! '4;
We have just dened embeddings of Nelson's logic into positive intuitionistic
and intuitionistic logics.
Theorem 2.1. 1. For every ' 2 Fm, the following equivalence holds:
' 2 N4 i '4 2 IPC+:
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2. For every ' 2 Fm, the following equivalences hold:
' 2 N4? i '4 2 IPC;
' 2 N3 i '3 2 IPC;
The statement for N3 was originally proved by Vorob'ev [38].
3. n-Characterizing models for Nelson's logics
AnN4-modelM = hW;; V i with V : Litn ! 2W is said to be n-characterizing
for a logic L extendingN4 (N4?) i for every ' 2 Fm(Pn) (' 2 Fm(Pn)),
we have ' 2 L i M  '.
The semantics of Nelson's logics treats the literals  p in the same
way as propositional variables. Due to this reason the construction of n-
characterizing model for N4 (N4?) is very similar to the construction of
2n-characterizing model for IPC+ (IPC) from [24]. To avoid confusions we
provide however the construction with all details.
For an N4-model M = hW;; V i, we denote by Sli(M) the set of
x 2W with depth i w.r.t. . Put Si(M) =
S
1ji Slj(M).
Now we construct an n-characterizing model for the logic N4 as a join
of an ascending chain of N4-models Nk = hNk;k; Vki, Vk : Litn ! 2Ik ,
k 2 !.
We start with a model N1 = hN1;1; V1i such that hN1;1i is an
antichain, and the valuation V1 is chosen so that
8x; y 2 N1 (x 6= y ) LitN1(x) 6= LitN1(y));
fLitN1(x) j x 2 N1g = 2Litn n fLitng:
Assume that the model Nk = hNk;k; Vki has been constructed and
dene Nk+1. Let ACk be the set of all antichains of the model Nk which
contain at least one element of depth k. For each  2 ACk, we consider new
elements j and sets Lit(j)  Litn indexed by elements of such a set X
that
8j1; j2 2 X(j1 6= j2 ) Lit(j1) 6= Lit(j2));
if jjjj  2, then
fLit(j) j j 2 Xg = fY j Y 
\
fLitNk(x) j x 2 gg;
if  = fbg, then
fLit(j) j j 2 Xg = fY j Y $ LitNk(b)g;
Let Nk+1 = Nk[fj j  2 ACk; j 2 Xg. For j 2 Nk+1 nNk and x 2 Nk,
we put
j < x i (x 2 ) _ 9y 2 (y k x):
Dene the relation k+1 on Nk+1 by putting
k+1=k [ < [ IdNk+1 :
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Obviously, we have dened a partial ordering Nk+1. Finally, we dene the
valuation:
Vk+1() = Vk() [ fj j  2 ACk; j 2 X;  2 Lit(j)g;
where  2 Litn. It is easy to see that Vk+1() is a cone w.r.t. k+1.
Thus, the N4-model Nk+1 = hNk+1;k+1; Vk+1i is completely dened.
It is clear that Nk is a cone w.r.t. k+1 and Nk = Sk(Nk+1), respectively the
model Nk is a generated submodel of Nk+1.
The N4-model N (n) = hN(n);; V (n)i is dened so that
N(n) =
[
k>0
Nk;  =
[
k>0
k; V (n)() =
[
k>0
Vk():
Proposition 3.1. The model N (n) is n-characterizing for the logics N4 and
N4?.
Proof. Since N (n) is an N4-model, we have N (n)  ' for all ' 2 N4 \
Fm(Pn). Assume that ' 2 Fm(Pn) n N4, then there exists a nite
N4-model M refuting ', which has no duplications and twins, and has
no worlds x such that M; x  Litn. Due to this reason for every maxi-
mal element x of M one can nd a maximal element y of N (n) such that
LitM(x) = LitN (n)(y). Identifying maximal elements of M with respective
maximal elements of N (n) we obtain the model M1, i.e., we replace the
maximal elements from M by respective maximal elements of N (n). Thus,
S1(M1) is a cone of N (n). Assume that we have already constructed a model
Mk such that Sk(Mk) is a cone of N (n), the depth of Mk is not greater
then the depth of M, and Mk 1 '. Let us construct a model Mk+1 with
similar properties.
Since M has no duplications, for every element x 2 Slk+1(Mk), there
is an element a 2 Nk+1 such that
LitMk(x) = LitN (n)(a) and fy 2Mk j x < yg = fy 2 N(n) j a < yg: (3.1)
SinceM has no twins, there is only one element x 2 Slk+1(Mk) satisfy-
ing (1), and we identify this element with the element a of N (n). In this way
we obtain the model Mk+1. It is not hard to see that Mk+1 1 '. Clearly,
Sk+1(Mk+1) is a cone of N(n), and the depth ofMk+1 is equal to the depth
of Mk. Since M is nite, after a nite number of steps we obtain a model
Mm such that it is a cone of N (n) and Mm 1 '. Consequently, N (n) 1 '.
To prove that N (n) is n-characterizing for N4? let us take a formula
' 2 Fm(Pn) such that ' 62 N4?. This formula is refutable on a nite N4-
model M, which has no duplications and twins, and has no worlds x such
that M; x  Litn. We just proved that every such model can be embedded
into N (n) as a cone. Consequently, ' is refutable on N (n) too.

Proposition 3.2. Every sharp cone of the model N (n) is Pn-denable.
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Proof. We construct dening formulas for sharp cones [x] using induction on
the depth of x.
For x 2 S1(N (n)), put
f(x) :=
^
LitN (n)(x) ^ (
_
(Litn n LitN (n)(x))!
^
Litn):
It is clear that N (n); y  f(x) i y = x.
Assume that for every x 2 Sm(N (n)) we have constructed the formula
f(x) that distinguishes the sharp cone [x] from other elements of N (n). For
all x 2 Slm+1(N (n)), dene
g(x) :=
^
ff(c)!
_
x<b
f(b) j x 6 c; c 2 Sm(N (n))g:
It is clear that for every y 2 Sm+1(N (n)), we have
N (n); y  g(x) , hyi \Nm  hxi \Nm: (3.2)
Further, we let
l(x) :=
^
'2LitnnLitN(n)(x)
('!
_
x<b
f(b))
and
h(x) :=
^
fg(c)!
_
r2Sm(N (n))
f(r) j c 2 Slm+1(N (n)); hci $ hxig
for all x 2 Slm+1(N (n)). Finally,
f(x) :=
^
LitN (n)(x) ^ g(x) ^ l(x) ^ h(x):
Consider some a 2 Slm+1(N (n)) and prove that f(a) is the desired
formula, i.e., that f(a) denes [a]. It is easy to see that N (n); a  f(a).
Consider an element d 2 Slm+1(N (n)) with hdi 6= hai. Then either hdi *
hai or hdi $ hai. If hdi * hai, then N (n); d 1 g(a) by (2). If hdi $ hai,
then N (n); d  g(d), but N (n); d 1 Wr2Sm(N (n)) f(r) since d 62 Slm(N (n)).
Consequently, N (n); d 1 h(a).
Let d 2 Slm+1(N (n)), hdi = hai, and d 6= a. If LitN (n)(a) * LitN (n)(d),
then N (n); d 1 VLitN (n)(a). Assume that LitN (n)(a) $ LitN (n)(d) and
' 2 LitN (n)(d) n LitN (n)(a). We have N (n); d  ' and N (n); d 1
W
a<b f(b),
whence N (n); d 1 l(a). We have thus proved that
8d 2 Slm+1(N (n))(d 6= a ) N (n); d 1 f(a)): (3.3)
Assume now that r 2 Sm+2+k(N (n)) and N (n); r  f(a). By (3) we
have [r] \ Slm+1(N (n)) = fag and there exists d 2 Slm+2(N (n)) with r 
d < a.
Let, rst, hdi = [a]. Then, by construction ofN(n) we have LitN (n)(d) $
LitN (n)(a). Consequently, N (n); r 1
V
LitN (n)(a) and N (n); r 1 f(a).
Let now, hdi 6= [a]. Then there is b, b 2 Sm(N (n)), where d < b, b =2 hai.
In this case we get N (n); d 1 g(a) and consequently, N (n); r 1 f(a).
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Finally, suppose that c 2 Sm(N (n)), a 6 c, and N (n); c  f(a). We
have also N (n); c  f(c). From N (n); c  g(a) we obtain N (n); c  f(b) for
some b > a. Consequently, a < c, which contradicts the assumption a 6 c.

It remains to construct an n-characteristic models N 3(n), NN(n), and
N (n) for the logics N3, N4N, and respectively N4. We dene them as a
generated submodels of N (n) with the following set of worlds:
N3(n) = fx 2 N(n) j 8p 2 Pn 8y  x (y 6 p^  p)g;
NN(n) = fx 2 N(n) j 8p 2 Pn8y  x(y 2 S1(N (n)) ) y  p_  p)g;
N(n) = fx 2 N3(n) j 8p 2 Pn8y  x(y 2 S1(N (n)) ) y  p_  p)g:
In other worlds, the model N 3(n) consists of those worlds of N (n),
which are consistent and have only consistent extensions; the model NN(n)
consists of worlds with complete maximal extensions. Finally, N (n) consists
of consistent worlds with classical maximal extensions.
Proposition 3.3. The model N 3(n) (NN(n), N (n)) is n-characterizing for
the logic N3 (N4N, N4) .
Proof. It is obvious that N 3(n) is an N3-model, therefore, N 3(n)  ' for all
' 2 N3\Fm(Pn). To complete the proof let us take a formula ' 2 Fm(Pn)
such that ' 62 N3. This formula is refutable on a nite N3-model M, which
has no duplications and twins, and has no worlds x such that M; x  Litn.
It is also an N4-model and we know that M can be embedded into N (n)
as a cone. Since all worlds of the N3-model M are consistent, its image is
contained in N 3(n). Thus, M can be considered as a generated submodel
of N 3(n), and we may conclude that ' is refutable on N 3(n), i.e., N 3(n) is
n-characterizing for N3.
To prove that NN(n) is n-characterizing for N4N we have to embed
an arbitrary nite N4N-model M as cone into NN(n). Let us consider the
image of M in N (n). We know that all maximal worlds of M are complete.
It is obvious that the images of maximal complete worlds are maximal and
complete as well. Thus, the image of M is a subset of N4N.
For N (n), the proof follows the same line.

All sharp cones of N 3(n), NN(n), and N (n) are Pn-denable, because
they are cones of N (n).
4. Admissibility and weak admissibility of inference rules in
N4 and N4?
We recall that a rule of inference with parameters is an expression r of the
form
'1(x; p); : : : ; 'n(x; p)
 (x; p)
;
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where 'i and  are formulas, x and p are tuples of propositional variables, x
are variables of r and p are parameters of r. The rule r is said to be admissible
in a logic L extending N4 or N4? if for every tuple of formulas  in the
respective language, we have  (; p) 2 L whenever '1(; p); : : : ; 'n(; p) 2 L.
Obviously, the rule r is admissible in L i the rule
'1(x; p) ^ : : : ^ 'n(x; p)
 (x; p)
is admissible in L. Therefore, in what follows we consider only rules with one
premiss. Further, since every formula is equivalent in L to its negative normal
form, the rule
'(x; p)
 (x; p)
is admissible in a logic L i the rule
'\(x; p)
 \(x; p)
is admissible in L. So, studying the admissibility problem in extensions of
Nelson's logics it will be sucient to consider rules of the form
'(x; x; p; p)
 (x; x; p; p) ;
where '; 2 Fm+ if we consider N4-extensions, and '; 2 Fm? in case of
N4?-extensions.
First we notice that the admissibility problem for the logics N4 and
N4? is equivalent to the following strengthening of admissibility problem for
IPC+ and respectively IPC considered over the extended set of propositional
variables Prop [ Propy.
For ' 2 Fm?(Prop [ Propy), we dene its dual formula 'd as follows:
pdi := p
y
i (p
y
i )
d := pi
( ^ )d :=  d _ d ( _ )d :=  d ^ d
( ! )d :=  ^ d ?d := p0 ! p0
Let x and y denote disjoint tuples of propositional variables of the same
length. For '(x; y; p),  (x; y; p) 2 Fm+(Prop[Propy) (Fm?(Prop[Propy))
the rule
'(x; y; p)
 (x; y; p)
is d-admissible1 in a logic L extending IPC+ (IPC) if for every tuple  of for-
mulas from Fm+(Prop[Propy) (Fm?(Prop[Propy)) we have  (; d; p) 2
L whenever '(; d; p) 2 L. Here d denote a tuple of formulas dual to for-
mulas from .
1The letter \d" is from \dependent", because there is a dependence between formulas
substituted for variables xi and yi. If xi is replaced by i, then yi must be replaced by its
dual di .
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Proposition 4.1. Let '(x; y; p; q),  (x; y; p; q) 2 Fm+(Prop) (Fm?(Prop)).
The rule
'(x; x; p; p)
 (x; x; p; p)
is admissible in N4 (N4?) i the rule
'(x; y; p; pd)
 (x; y; p; pd)
with parameters p and pd is d-admissible in IPC+ (IPC).
Proof. We only consider the case of N4 and IPC+.
Assume that  is such that '(; ; p; p) 2 N4, but  (; ; p;
p) 62 N4. According to Theorem 2.1 we conclude ('(; ; p; p))4 2 IPC+
and ( (; ; p; p))4 62 IPC+. Taking into account that the translation
()4 commutes with positive connectives we obtain '(()4; ( )4; p; pd) 2
IPC+ and  (()4; ( )4; p; pd) 62 IPC+. By induction on the structure of
formulas we can easily check that ( )4 = (4)d, which allows us to conclude
that
'(4; (4)d; p; pd) 2 IPC+ and  (4; (4)d; p; pd) 62 IPC+
We have thus proved that d-admissibility in IPC+ implies admissibility in
N4.
To prove the inverse implication assume that '(; d; p; pd) 2 IPC+ and
 (; d; p; pd) 62 IPC+ for a tuple  of positive formulas.
For a formula  2 Fm+(Prop [ Propy), we denote by 0 the result of
replacement of every variable pyi by  pi. It is clear that 0 2 Fm and
(0)4 = . Using this fact we can prove by induction on the structure of
formulas that for every  2 Fm+(Prop[Propy), we have ( 0)4 = d. From
this fact and the denition of translation ()4 we obtain
('(0; 0; p; p))4 = '(; d; p; pd):
Consequently, '(0; 0; p; p) 2 N4. In a similar way,  (0; 0; p; p) 62
N4. We have thus proved that the rule '(x;x;p;p) (x;x;p;p) is not admissible in N4.

The admissibility problem for the logics N4 and N4? is reduced in this
way to d-admissibilty problem for positive and intuitionistic logics. We are
not ready to solve either of these problems, but in view of the fact that literals
pi and  pi are interpreted independently in N4-models there is a sense to
consider a weak form of admissibility, which assumes that literals p and  p
are replaced not by formulas  and  , but by arbitrary formulas  and .
We say that an inference rule
'(x; x; p; p)
 (x; x; p; p)
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is weakly admissible in N4 (N4?) if for every tuples of formulas  and 
of the same length as x, we have  (; ; p; p) 2 N4 (N4?), whenever
'(; ; p; p) 2 N4 (N4?).
The weak admissibility problem for N4 (N4?) is equivalent to admis-
sibility problem for positive intuitionistic logic (intuitionistic logic).
Proposition 4.2. Let '(x; y; p; q),  (x; y; p; q) 2 Fm+(Prop) (Fm?(Prop)).
The rule
'(x; x; p; p)
 (x; x; p; p)
is weakly admissible in N4 (N4?) i the rule
'(x; y; p; pd)
 (x; y; p; pd)
is admissible in IPC+ (IPC).
Proof. Again, we will consider only the case of N4 and IPC+.
Assume that tuples of formulas  and  are such that '(; ; p; p) 2
N4, but  (; ; p; p) 62 N4. By Theorem 2.1 we have ('(; ; p; p))4 2
IPC+ and ( (; ; p; p))4 62 IPC+. Since ()4 commutes with positive
connectives and send pi to p
y
i , we have '((
)4; ()4; p; pd) 2 IPC+ and
 (()4; ()4; p; pd) 62 IPC+. The latter means that admissibility in IPC+
implies weak admissibility in N4.
Now we assume that '(; ; p; pd) 2 IPC+ and  (; ; p; pd) 62 IPC+
for tuples  and  of positive formulas with variables from Prop[Propy. The
formula 0 is dened as in the proof of the previous proposition. Recall that
(0)4 = . By denition of ()4 we have
('(0;  0; p; p))4 = '(; ; p; pd) and ( (0;  0; p; p))4 =  (; ; p; pd);
whence '(0;  0; p; p) 2 N4 and  (0;  0; p; p) 62 N4, which proves that
the rule '(x;x;p;p) (x;x;p;p) is not weakly admissible in N4.

From this proposition and the facts that the problems of admissibility
of rules with parameters for positive logic IPC+ [24] and for intuitionistic
logic IPC [31] are algorithmically decidable we obtain the following
Corollary 4.3. The problems of weak admissibility of rules with parameters
for Nelson's logics N4 and N4? are algorithmically decidable.
5. Weak admissibility of rules in N3, N4N, and N4
Earlier we have dened the notion of weak admissibility specially for the log-
ics N4 and N4?, because this notion reects a unique semantic feature of
these logics: the interpretations of literals V (p) and V ( p) are completely in-
dependent one from the other. Passing from N4 and N4? to their extensions
will impose restrictions on the interrelations between V (p) and V ( p), so
16 S. Odintsov and V. Rybakov
the adequate notion of weak admissibility for these logics must reect these
restrictions. In this section we dene and investigate the notion of weak ad-
missibility for the logicsN3,N4N, andN4. The class ofN3-models is distin-
guished in the class of all N4-models by the requirement V (p)\V ( p) = ?,
which reects the fact that :(p^  p) 2 N3. Recall that here the symbol :
denotes the intuitionistic negation denable in N3 as :' := ' ! ?. This
restriction has the following natural syntactical correspondence: instead of p
and  p we have to substitute a pair of inconsistent formulas  and , i.e.
:( ^ ) 2 N3. These considerations lead to the following denition.
Let '(x; y; p; q),  (x; y; p; q) 2 Fm?(Prop). We say that the inference
rule
'(x; x; p; p)
 (x; x; p; p)
with parameters is weakly admissible in N3 if for every tuples of formulas
 and  of the same length as x and such that :( ^ ) 2 N3, we have
 (; ; p; p) 2 N3, whenever '(; ; p; p) 2 N3. Naturally, the denotation
:( ^ ) 2 N3 means that :(i ^ i) 2 N3 for all respective components i
and i of tuples  and .
The class of N4N-models is distinguished in the class of all N4-models
by the requirement that (V (p) [ V ( p)) # coincides with the set of all
worlds, which corresponds to ::(p_  p) 2 N4N. In case of nite models
this requirement can be replaced by the following: all maximal worlds are
in V (p) [ V ( p). The class of N4-models is the intersection of classes of
N3- and N4N-models. Naturally, we dene the weak admissibility of rules
for these logics as follows.
We say that the inference rule
'(x; x; p; p)
 (x; x; p; p)
with parameters is weakly admissible in N4N (N4) if for every tuples of
formulas  and  of the same length as x and such that ::( _ ) 2 N4N
(::( _ ) 2 N4 and :( ^ ) 2 N4), we have  (; ; p; p) 2 N3,
whenever '(; ; p; p) 2 N3.
Unfortunately, we do not see a possibility to reduce the weak admissi-
bility problem for N3, N4N, and N4 to the solved admissibility problem
for intuitionistic logic in a way similar to that for paraconsistent versions of
Nelson logic. Due to this reason we adapt a technique from [24].
For a rule r = '(x; x; p; p)= (x; x; p; p), denote by Sub(r) the
set Sub(f'; g), by V P (r) the set of all variables and parameters and by P (r)
the set of all parameters of the rule r. We put Lit(r) = V P (r)[  V P (r)
and LitP (r) = P (r)[  P (r).
For every subset M  2Sub(r), we dene an N4-model M = hM;; V i,
where the valuation V : Lit(r) ! 2M is dened so that V () = fX 2
M j  2 Xg for  2 Lit(r). It is clear that M is an N3-model i all
X 2 M are consistent w.r.t. literals, i.e. there are no pi and X 2 M such
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that fpi; pig  X. M is an N4N-model i for every maximal X 2M end
every pi 2 V P (r) either pi or  pi is in X.
Recall that (just by denition) if an inference rule r = '(x; x; p;
p)= (x; x; p; p) is not admissible in N3 (N4N, N4), then there is a
model N 3(n) (NN(n), N (n)), where Pn contains all P (r), and a den-
able N3- (N4N-, N4-)valuation V1 coinciding with the original valuation of
N 3(n) (NN(n), N (n)) on literals from LitP (r), where ' is true w.r.t. V1 at
all worlds from N (n), but  is false w.r.t. V1 at some world.
Proposition 5.1. Let r = '(x; x; p; p)= (x; x; p; p) be an infer-
ence rule with parameters and let n be such that P (r)  Pn. Suppose that,
for an arbitrary N3-(N4N-, N4-)valuation V1 of all literals from r in N 3(n)
(NN(n), N (n)) which coincides with the original valuation of N 3(n) (NN(n),
N (n)) on LitP (r), V1(') = N3(n) (NN(n), N(n)) and V1( ) 6= N3(n)
(NN(n), N(n)). Then there exists M  2Sub(r) such that the N3-(N4N-,
N4-)model M = hM;; V i has the following properties:
(a) 8 2 Sub(r)8X 2M(M; X   ,  2 X)
(b) 8r  M 8b  TfLitM(X) \ LitP (r) j X 2 rg (or 8b  LitP (r) if r
is empty) if b is consistent, then
9Y 2M(b = LitM(Y ) \ LitP (r) &
[r = ? ) ( !  2 Sub(r) ) ( !  2 Y , ( =2 Y _  2 Y )))]
[r 6= ?) Y  TfX j X 2 rg] & (( !  2 Sub(r) &  !  62 Y ) )
(( 2 Y &  62 Y ) _ 9X 2 r( !  62 X)));
(c) 8X 2M(' 2 X) &  62 Xm, where Xm := infhM;i.
Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary N3-valuation V1 in N 3(n) for all letters
from r, which agrees with the original valuation V (n) on LitP (r), where
V1(') = N(n) and V1( ) 6= N(n).
For every a 2 N3(n), we put
t(a) := f 2 Sub(r) j a V1 g:
The set M is dened as ft(a) j a 2 N3(n)g. Since V1 is an N3-valuation,
the respectiveM is an N3-model. We prove thatM satises all the required
properties.
We, rst, proof the property (a) by induction on the length of the for-
mula . For elements of Lit(r) the desired equivalence holds by denition of
the valuation V in the modelM. Consider the case of complex formulas. Let
M; X   ^ . Then M; X   and M; X  , and we have by induction
hypothesis  2 X and  2 X. By denition of M there is a 2 N3(n) such
that X = t(a), and we have a V1  and a V1 . Consequently, a V1  ^ ,
i.e.,  ^  2 X. On the other hand, if  ^  2 X and X = t(a), then a V1 
and a V1 . Therefore,  2 X and  2 X. By the induction hypothesis we
have M; X   and M; X  , which implies M; X   ^ .
The case of disjunction can be treated in a similar way.
Since ' and  are nnf, we do not need to consider the cases of negated
formulas. So it remains only to consider the case of implication. Let  !  2
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X. If X  Y and M; Y  , then  !  2 Y and  2 Y by the induction
hypothesis. Since Y = t(a) for some a, we have  2 Y and hence M; Y  .
Thus, M; X   ! . Conversely, suppose that  !  62 X. Since X = t(a)
for some a, we have a 1V1  ! . Consequently, there is an element b such
that a  b, b V1  and b 1V1 . By induction hypothesis we haveM; t(b)  
and M; t(b) 1 . Moreover, X = t(a)  t(b), consequently, M; X 1  ! .
The property (a) is thus proved.
We proceed to the proof of the property (b). Assume that r = ?.
By construction of the n-characterizing model N 3(n), for every consistent
b  LitP (r), there is a maximal in N 3(n) element a such that LitN (n)(a) = b
(since P (r)  Pn). Since V (n) and V1 agree on LitP (r), LitM(t(a)) = b.
Finally, the maximality of a implies that  !  2 t(a) i  =2 t(a) or  2 t(a)).
Consider the case r 6= ?. Let r = ft(aj) j aj 2 N3(n); j 2 Jg, and
b 
\
fLitM(X) \ LitP (r) j X 2 rg:
By the construction of the model N 3(n), there exists c 2 N3(n) such
that [c] = fcg [Sf[aj ] j j 2 Jg. Moreover, if b $ TfLitM(t(aj)) \ LitP (r) j
j 2 Jg or if there is no smallest element among the aj 's w.r.t. , then there
exists c with the property LitM(c) = b. In the other case, when a smallest
element does exists and the above property for b is not true, we take this
smallest element as c. We dene Y := t(c). The truth of all the necessary
properties can be veried directly.
By the condition of the theorem for all a 2 N3(n), we have a V1 ',
i.e., ' 2 t(a) for all a. On the other hand, there exists b 2 N3(n) such that
b 1V1  . So,  62 t(b). By (b) there exists a smallest element Xm in M, and
Xm  t(b) implies  62 Xm. So, property (c) is also true.
It is clear that if V1 is an N4
N-(N4-)valuation in N 3(n), then the
model M dened as above is an N4N-(N4-)model. The rest of the proof is
the same.
AAAAAA The same as what?

The next theorem plays the central part for deciding admissibility.
Theorem 5.2. If r = '(x; x; p; p)= (x; x; p; p) is an inference rule
with parameters and there exists M  2Sub(r) such that M = hM;; V i is an
N3-(N4N-,N4-)model and has properties (a){(c) from Proposition 5.1, then
for some n, where P (r)  Pn, there exist formulas  and  in propositional
letters from Pn such that :( ^ ) 2 N3 (:( ^ ) 2 N4N, respectively :( ^
) 2 N4 and :( ^ ) 2 N4) and
'(; ; p; p) 2 N3(N4N;N4);  (; ; p; p) 62 N3(N4N;N4):
Moreover, formulas  and  can be constructed eectively in M.
Proof. First we consider the logic N3. Let M  2Sub(r) be such that M =
hM;; V i is an N3-model and has properties (a){(c) from Proposition 5.1.
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Take the model N 3(n), where n = jjM jj+jjLitP (r)jj. We assume any X from
M to be associated with the letter pX from Dom(V
(n)), and P (r) just to be
letters from Dom(V (n)) of N 3(n). Let us extend the valuation V of the model
M to all variables pX , X 2M , by putting V (pX) := fY 2M j Y * Xg and
V ( pX) := ?. Since V ( pX) := ? it will be again an N3-valuation. In
what follows M denotes a model with the extended valuation, in particular,
atoms of the form pX are true or false at worlds of M and a literals  pX
are false at worlds of M.
Our goal is to construct a denableN3-valuation V1 of N 3(n) such that
V1 agrees with V
(n) on LitP (r) and satises:
V1('(x; x; p; p)) = N3(n) and V1( ('(x; x; p; p)) 6= N3(n):
To this end we construct an ascending sequence of N3-models ek(M), k 2 !
(which are based at cones of N 3(n)) with denable in N 3(n) valuations,
which agree with V (n) on LitP (r). Moreover, for every k 2 !, it will be
ek(M) =
S
Y 2M ek(Y ), where any ek(Y ) is a denable cone ofN 3(n). Finally,
we will need that for every k  0 the following conditions are satised.
(p1) ek 1(X)  ek(X) for all X 2M . Here we assume e 1(X) = ? and
e 1(M) = ?.
(p2) For all a 2 ek(M) n ek 1(M) there is a unique X(a; k) in M such that:
a 2 ek(X(a; k)) n ek 1(M) and X(a; k + 1) is greatest among all Y ,
where a 2 ek(Y ) n ek 1(M).
(p3) If c 2 N 3(n), c =2 ek(M), and
Mk(c) := fY 2M j 9a 9j 2 [0; k] c < a; a 2 ej(X(a; j)) n ej 1(M)g;
then jjMk(c)jj  k + 1.
(p4) The valuation Vk of ek(M) is dened on Lit(r). It agrees with V (n) on
LitP (r), whereas for literals  of the form z or  z, where z is variable
letter of r, we have
Vk() :=
[
0jk
fej(Y ) j  2 Y; Y 2Mg;
Vk coincides with any Vj on ej(M) for j < k. In this way, ej(M) is a
generated submodel of ek(M).
(p5) 8l  k, 8' 2 Sub(r), 8a 2 el(M) n el 1(M) (e 1(M) = ?, cf. (p1)
above) 
el(M); a Vl ' , ' 2 X(a; l)]: (5.1)
Let us consider the case k = 0 and dene the model e0(M). By choice
of n there is no world X ofM such that (M; X) V
V
Litn (cf. the denition
of V for new literals pX and  pX , X 2 M , in M). If X;Y 2 M and the
sets X and Y are incomparable w.r.t. inclusion, then X V pY , X 1V pX ,
Y V pX , and Y 1V pY , i.e., LitM(X) 6= LitM(Y ). This implies that the
model M has no twins. If X;Y 2 M and X $ Y , then X 1V pX and
Y V pX . Consequently, M has no duplications.
20 S. Odintsov and V. Rybakov
We know from the proof of Proposition 3.1 that every nite N3-model
with the above listed properties can be embedded into N 3(n) as a generated
submodel. Let e be an embedding of M into N 3(n). In this case, e(M) is a
cone of N 3(n), besides, by (a) from Proposition 5.1,
8Y 2M8' 2 Sub(r)[N 3(n); e(Y ) V (n) ', ' 2 Y ]: (5.2)
Now we will extend the model e(M) to a model e0(M) containing all worlds
of the model N 3(n) with depth 1. Note that since M is a nite object and
N 3(n) is eectively constructed, the construction of e(M) is also eective,
and by c 2 S1(N 3(n)) we can eectively decide, whether c 2 e(M).
Take any c 2 S1(N 3(n)) n e(M), if one exists. By (b) from Proposi-
tion 5.1 there is Y 2M for r = ? and b := LitP (r)\LitN3(n)(c) such that
LitP (r) \ LitM(Y ) = LitP (r) \ LitN3(n)(c). We can eectively nd one of
such elements. Denote it by X0(c; 0). For every Y 2M , we put
a0(Y ) = fc 2 S1(N 3(n))ne(M) j X0(c; 0) = Y g and e0(Y ) := [e(Y )][a0(Y ):
Since X0(c; 0) can be eectively found by c, we can eectively compute
e0(Y ) by Y 2M . Let
S
Y 2M e0(Y ) be the set of worlds of e0(M). We intro-
duce the following valuation V0 in e0(M) dened on Lit(r): it agrees with
V (n) on LitP (r), whereas for  = xj or  = xj , xj 2 x, we put
V0() = fc 2 S1(N 3(n)) n e(M) j M; X0(c; 0)  g [ (e(M) \ V (n)(xj)):
Clearly, the cone V0() can be eectively determined by . By Propo-
sition 3.2 every sharp cone of N 3(n) is Pn-denable, every V0() is a nite
union of sharp cones, therefore, it is also Pn-denable. We obtain that the
valuation V0 is denable in N 3(n). Moreover, dening formulas for V0()
can be constructed eectively, because the cones V0() are constructed eec-
tively. For any Y 2 M, the cone e0(X) is denable in N 3(n), and again we
can eectively construct the formulas s0(Y ) dening cones e0(Y ). In every
world of e0(M), the validity of literals is dened in the same way as in one
of worlds of M. Since M is an N3-model, e0(M) also is an N3-model.
We have thus constructed the N3-model e0(M) with a denable in
N 3(n) valuation. Conditions (p1), (p3), and (p4) are satised for this model
in an obvious way.
The sets X0(c; 0) were dened for all c 2 S1(N 3(n))ne(M), and for such
c, we set X(c; 0) := X0(c; 0). For c 2 e(M), we choose X(c; 0) as a pre-image
of c, w.r.t. e, i.e. e(X0(c; 0)) = c. These sets X(c; 0) validate condition (p2).
Let c 2 S1(N 3(n)) n e(M). Since the set X(c; 0) corresponds to the
empty set r, by item (b) of Proposition 5.1 we have  !  2 X(c; 0) i
 =2 X(c; 0) or  2 X(c; 0) for  !  2 Sub(r). Since c is a maximal element
of N 3(n), we have c V0  !  i c 1V0  or c V0 . This observation and
denition of V0 allow to prove that, for all such c,
8' 2 Sub(r)[ c V0 ' , ' 2 X(c; 0)]: (5.3)
For c 2 e(M), the above equivalence holds in an obvious way. Thus,
condition (p5) is veried. So, for k = 0 all (p1) - (p5) hold.
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Inductive step:
Suppose that we constructed already for a given k  0 and all l  k
the cones el(Y ) of N 3(n) for Y 2 M such that any el(Y ) is denable in
N 3(n) by a formula sl(Y ), and we dened the models el(M), l  k, such
that
S
Y 2M el(Y ) is the set of worlds of el(M) and conditions (p1) { (p5)
hold for el(M).
Now we proceed to the construction of the model ek+1(M). Consider
all r M , where jjrjj = k + 1. Let r = fY1; : : : ; Yk+1g.
Take an arbitrary subset b of
T
j2[1;k+1](LitM(Yj) \ LitP (r)). For any
pair r, b dened as above, there is Xr;b 2 M satisfying property (b) of
Proposition 5.1 for givenr and b, x it. Notice that if r contains the smallest
set Y and b = br =
T
j2[1;k+1](Yj \LitP (r)) then we can choose as Xr;b this
Y and we do so (evidently this Y satises property (b) of Proposition 5.1).
We, in the sequel, will denote such Y by Xminr;br . Otherwise, i.e. if r contains
no smallest set or b 6= Tj2[1;k+1](Yj \LitP (r)), the set Xr;b does not belong
to r.
If Xminr;br was dened for given r, in particular, Xminr;br 2 r we set:
rmin :=
^
br ^ (
_
(LitP (r) n br)!
_
Y 2M
sk(Y ));
 r :=
^
Y =2r
^
0jk
[sj(Y )!
_
YY1
sj(Y1) _
_
Z2M
sj 1(Z)];
'1(r; br) := rmin ^  r:
(for s 1(Z) we put ?).
It is clear that rmin is valid at the world x ofN 3(n) i all atoms from br
are valid at x and the validity of some atom from LitP (r)nb at y  x implies
y 2 ek(M). The validity of  r at x means, in particular, that Mk(x)  r.
If Xr;b =2 r, we dene the formula  r as above and put:
b;r :=
^
b ^ (
_
(LitP (r) n b)!
_
Y 2M
sk(Y ) _ (r));
where (r) = '1(r; br) if r contains the least element, otherwise
(r) = ?,
'2(r; b) := b;r ^  r:
For any Y 2M we set
ek+1(Y ) := ek(Y ) [ V (n)(
_
Y=Xminr;br
'1(r; br) _
_
Y=Xr;b
'2(r; b)):
Lemma 5.3. Properties (p1) - (p5) hold for ek+1(Y ), Y 2M .
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Proof. It is clear that (p1) holds for ek+1(Y ) for any Y .
For (p2):
let a 2 ek+1(M) n ek(M). We will need the following intermediate
statement (it holds for any k  0):
Proposition 5.4. If a 2 ek+1(Y ) n ek(M) then for r = Mk(a) either (i)
a 2 ek+1(Xminr;br) n ek(M) and Y  Xminr;br or (ii): a =2 ek+1(Xminr;br) n ek(M)
and Y = Xr;b for a unique Xr;b, were b  br.
Proof. If a 2 ek+1(Y )n ek(M) then a V (n)  r for some r. By our choice of
 r we have Mk(a)  r. On the other hand by (p3) for k there are at least
k+1 dierent sets Yj in M
k(a). Consequently, Mk(a) = r. Thus, the family
of sets r is uniquely determined by a. Then either (a) a V (n) '1(r; br) and
Y  Xminr;br or (b) a V (n) '2(r; b) and Y = Xr;b for some Xr;b. If (a) does
not hold, (b) holds and there is only one unique such Xr;b.

In case (i) we set X(a; k + 1) = Xminr;br , in the case (ii)
we put X(a; k + 1) := Xr;b. So, (p2) is veried.
For (p3):
Let c 2 N 3(n)nek+1(M). We have to prove jjMk+1(c)jj  k+2. By (p3)
for k, jjMk(c)jj  k+1. Obviously,Mk(c) Mk+1(c), so jjMk+1(c)jj  k+1.
Assume jjMk+1(c)jj = k + 1, than Mk(c) = Mk+1(c). Let r := Mk+1(c),
and for any element a 2 N 3(n), ba := LitN3(n)(a) \ LitP (r).
The equality r =Mk(c), in particular, means that for each d > c such
that d 2 ej(Y )nej 1(M) (j  k) for some Y , we have d 2 ej(X(d; j))nej(M)
for some X(d; j) 2 r. Therefore, we have
c V (n)
^
Y =2r
^
0jk
[sj(Y )!
_
YY1
sj(Y1) _
_
Z2M
sj 1(Z)](=  r):
Assume that r has no least element (smallest set) and consider a max-
imal d  c with d =2 ek(M). Since d  c, we have Mk(d) Mk(c) = r.
At the same time jjMk(d)jj  k + 1 by d =2 ek(M) and (p3) for k,
consequently, Mk(d) = r. From the maximality of d, for bd = LitN3(n)(d) \
LitP (r) we immediately obtain
d V (n)
^
bd ^ (
_
(LitP (r) n bd)!
_
Y 2M
sk(Y )):
Since r has no least element, the last formula is equivalent to bd;r. We
have also d   r by c  d. Consequently, d  '2(r; bd) and d 2 ek+1(Xr;bd).
Moreover, since r has no least set, Xr;bd 62 r. By Proposition 5.4 we have
X(d; k + 1) = Xr;bd (since no X
min
r;br). This contradicts the earlier proved
equalities Mk+1(c) =Mk(c) = r.
Consider now the case whenr contains the smallest set. For any element
d, where c  d and d 62 ek(M) (in particular if d 62 ek+1(M)), we may show
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Mk(d) = r =Mk(c) the same way as above. ByMk(d) = r and Xminr;br 2 r
we conclude d  d1 for some d1 2 ej(X(d1; j)) n ej 1(M) for j  k and
X(d1; j) = X
min
r;br . Consequently always bd = LitN3(n)(d) \ LitP (r)  br.
Therefore, if bd = br we have
d V (n)
^
br ^ (
_
(LitP (r) n br)!
_
Y 2M
sk(Y ));
and d 2 ek+1(Xminr;br)
In particular, it holds for all d, where c  d, d 62 ek+1(M) and bd = br.
Thus if bc = br, we would have c 2 ek+1(Xminr;br) - a contradiction, so bc  br.
Take any c1 in hci n ek(M), then as we noticed above bc1  br, and if
bc1 = br we have c1 2 ek+1(Xminr;br). If bc1 = br for all such c1 > c, we would
have
c V (n) bc;r :=
^
bc ^ (
_
(LitP (r) n bc)!
_
Y 2M
sk(Y ) _ (r));
and c 2 ek+1(Xr;bc) - a contradiction. Assume now that there are c1 with
bc1  br, and choose a such c1 with maximal bc1 . So, c1 2 hci n ek(M), and
then if c1  c2 and bc1  bc2 then either c2 2 ek(M) or bc2 = br. Thus we
obtain
c1 V (n) bc1 ;r :=
^
bc1 ^ (
_
(LitP (r) n bc1)!
_
Y 2M
sk(Y ) _ (r));
and c1 2 ek+1(Xr;bc1 ), where bc1  br. So, c1 2 ek+1(X(c1; k + 1)), where
X(c1; k + 1) = Xr;bc1 (cf. Proposition 5.4) and Xr;bc1 =2 r since bc1  br.
This contradicts Mk(c) =Mk+1(c) = r. Thus (p3) for k + 1 is veried.
For (p4):
We dene the valuation Vk+1 as follows. For elements of LitP (r) it
coincides with V (n) and for literals  of the form z and  z, where z is a
variable of r, we set
Vk+1() :=
[
0jk+1
fej(Y ) j  2 Y; Y 2Mg:
From the denition of sets ek+1(Y ), Y 2 M , it follows that the valuation
Vk+1 is denable, extends Vk and coincides with V
(n) on LitP (r). We need
to show that Vk+1 coincides with Vl for l  k on el(M).
Let b 2 el(Y ) and b Vl , then b 2 el j(Y1) and  2 Y1. Then b 2
ek+1(Y1) and b Vk+1 . Conversely, let b 2 el(Y ) n el 1(M) and b Vk+1 
(the case of other l may evidently be reduced to this one by IH for (p4)).
Than b 2 ek+1(Y1) for some Y1, where  2 Y1. If b 2 ek(Y1) by IH for (p4) we
have b Vl . If b 2 ek+1(Y1) n ek(Y1) than b V (n)  r for some r. Besides
by (p2) b 2 el(X(b; l)) n el 1(M) and hence X(b; l) 2 r. From  2 Y1 and
Y1 = X
min
r;br or Y1 = Xr;b (cf. denition of ek+1(Y1)) we obtain  2 X(b; l).
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From b 2 el(X(b; l)) and  2 X(b; l) we conclude b Vl . Thus (p4) is
veried.
For (p5):
We need to show 8a 2 ek+1(M) n ek(M);
8' 2 Sub(r)a Vk+1 ', [ ' 2 X(a; k + 1)]: (5.4)
If a 2 ek+1(Y ) n ek(M), by (p2) for (k+1) and Proposition 5.4, we have
a 2 ek+1(X(a; k + 1)), where, for r =Mk(a),
(i) X(a; k+ 1) = Xminr;br and X
min
r;br  Y for all Y , where a 2 ek+1(Y ) n
ek(M)
or (disjointly)
(ii) Y = X(a; k + 1) = Xr;b for a unique Xr;b, where b  br.
Therefore by denition of Vk+1 (5.4) holds for every literal ' 2 Sub(r).
We continue our proof by induction on the length of '. Inductive steps for ^
and _ are evident, we do now !.
Direction: (
Let 1 ! 2 2 X(a; k + 1). Let a < c and c 2 ek(M). Then c 2
ej(X(c; j)) n ej 1(M) for some 0  j  k (recall that e 1(M) = ?) by (p2)
for k.
Therefore we obtain X(c; j) 2 r and because 1 ! 2 2 X(a; j+1) we
also have 1 ! 2 2 X(c; j) (cf. description of X(a; k+ 1) above). Therefore
by IH for (p5) we obtain: c Vj 1 ! 2 and consequently c Vk+1 1 ! 2.
Assume now that a  c and c =2 ek(M). Then c 2 ek+1(X(c; k + 1)) n
ek(M) by Proposition 5.4.
If the case (i):X(a; k+1) = Xminr;br , then a V (n) '1(r; br). Since a  c,
we have c V (n) '1(r; br) and c 2 ek+1(Xminr;br) n ek(M) and by Proposition
5.4 for c and properties ofXminr;br we obtainX(c; k+1) = X(a; k+1) and hence
1 ! 2 2 X(c; k+1). Consequently, if c Vk+1 1 then by IH 1 2 X(c; k+1)
and hence by 1 ! 2 2 X(c; k+1) we obtain 2 2 X(c; k+1), which by IH
implies c Vk+1 2. Thus a Vk+1 1 ! 2.
Assume now that we have case (ii): only the case Y= X(a; k+1) = Xr;b
is possible where b  br and Xr;b to be single, unique.
Then it could be two options for c: (a1) c 2 ek+1(Xminr;br) n ek(M) or
(a2) c 2 ek+1(X(a; k + 1)).
In case (a1) reasoning as above we conclude c Vk+1 1 ! 2. In case
(a2), if c  c1 62 ek(M), then either c1 2 ek+1(Xminr;br)nek(M), and reasoning
as above we obtain c1 Vk+1 1 ! 2. Or c1 2 ek+1(X(a; k+1)), and applying
IH we again conclude c1 Vk+1 1 ! 2. In total, we proved, a Vk+1 1 ! 2:
Direction: )
For opposite direction, assume now that 1 ! 2 =2 X(a; k+1). Then by
our choice of Xr;b and Xminr;br either (1) 1 2 X(a; k+1) and 2 =2 X(a; k+1),
or (2) 1 ! 2 =2 Y1 for some Y1 2 r = Mk(a). In the case (1) we have by
induction hypothesis a Vk+1 1 and a 1Vk+1 2, so a 1Vk+1 1 ! 2.
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Suppose we have the case (2) and 1 ! 2 =2 Y1 for some Y1 2 r. Since
r =Mk(a), there are c and j  k such that a  c, c 2 ej(X(c; j))n ej 1(M)
and Y1 = X(c; j). By IH for c (since j  k) we obtain c 1Vj 1 ! 2.
consequently c 1Vk+1 1 ! 2 and a 1Vk+1 1 ! 2
This completes proof of Lemma 5.3. 
By (p3) our procedure terminates at a step k, where k  m and m
is the number of worlds in M , and we get ek(M) = N 3(n). More exactly,
we may stop at the rst k such that
W
X2M sk(X) 2 N3. Due to (p5) we
have Vk('(x; x; p; p)) = N3(n) and Vk( (x; x; p; p)) 6= N3(n). We
know that Vk agrees with V
(n) on p and  p and that the cones Vk(xj) and
Vk( xj), xj 2 x, are denable in N 3(n) by formulas, say,  and , i.e.,
Vk(xj) = V
(n)(j) and Vk( xj) = V (n)(j), xj 2 x. In this way,
V (n)('(; ; p; p)) = Vk('(x; x; p; p)) = N3(n)
and
V (n)( (; ; p; p)) = Vk( (x; x; p; p)) 6= N3(n):
It remain to notice that :( ^ ) 2 N3. Assume that Vk is not an N3-
valuation, i.e. that x Vk p^  p for some x and p. Then y Vk p^  p for
some maximal world y over x. All maximal worlds of N 3 belong to e0(M),
consequently by (p4) we have y V0 p^  p. The latter is impossible, because
we know that V0 is an N3-valuation. We have thus proved that Vk is an N3-
valuation. Consequently, V (n)(j) \ V (n)(j) = ?, i.e. V (n)(j ^ j) = ?,
whence V (n)(:(j ^ j)) = N3(n). The latter means that :(j ^ j) 2 N3 for
all xj 2 x.
Assume now that we start from an N4N-model M. We argue as above
with the following two exceptions. First, we change the denition of the val-
uation V on literal  pX . For a maximal world x, the literal  pX is true at
x i pX is false at x. If x is not maximal, then  px is false at x. Second, we
have to notice that dening model e0(M) for every c 2 S1(NN) n e(M) we
can choose a world X0(c; 0) maximal inM (see the proof of Proposition 5.1).
All maximal worlds of M are complete, because this is an N4N-model. Con-
sequently all maximal worlds of e0(M) and of every ej(M) are complete too.
As a result we obtain an N4N-valuation V1. This means that V
(n)(j _ j)
contains all maximal worlds of NN(n), i.e. ::(j _ j) 2 N4N.
Suppose that now it is clear how to treat an N4-model M. AAAAAA
These remarks complete the proof of our Theorem 5.2.

From Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 5.2 we immediately obtain
Corollary 5.5 (Algorithmic criterion for weak admissibility inN3(N4N,N4)).
The rule with parameters r = '(x; x; p; p)= (x; x; p; p) is weakly
admissible in N3 (N4N, N4) i at least one of the conditions (a)-(c) from
Proposition 5.1 is falsied in M = hM;; Q; V i for every M  2Sub(r) such
that M is an N3-(N4N-, N4-)model.
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Recall that a rule r is said to be true on a frame w.r.t. a valuation V ,
if the conclusion of this rule is true w.r.t. V at all worlds from this frame,
when this holds for all formulas of the premise of r. From Proposition 5.1
and Theorem 5.2 we also immediately infer
Corollary 5.6 (Semantic criterion for weak admissibility in N3(N4N, N4)).
The rule with parameters r = '(x; x; p; p)= (x; x; p; p) is weakly
admissible in N3 (N4N, N4) i r is true on the frames of all models N 3(n)
(NN(n), N (n)), with Pn  P (r), w.r.t. all valuations coinciding with the
original valuations of the models N 3(n) (NN(n), N (n)) at all literals from
LitP (r).
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